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Merrill v. Fahs: Release of Marital Rights Is
Insufficient Consideration for
Transfer Tax Purposes
Kevin E. Packman*
The United States Supreme Court’s 1945 decision in Merrill v.
Fahs1 stands for the proposition that the release of marital rights in exchange for the receipt of property is insufficient consideration to avoid a
gift.2 Therefore, when the husband in that case transferred property to
his wife in accordance with the terms of a prenuptial agreement, and the
wife released marital rights in exchange for the husband’s transfer, the
husband’s transfer was properly classified as a taxable gift.3 Even
though Merrill remains good law, its impact is greatly reduced by legislative changes enacted in the years subsequent to the decision.
The taxpayer, Charles E. Merrill, entered into a prenuptial agreement the day before marrying his third wife, Kinta Desmare, on March
8, 1939. While Miss Desmare did not have any meaningful assets, the
Court noted that Mr. Merrill was financially secure.4 The prenuptial
agreement required Mr. Merrill to create three separate trusts, and for
Miss Desmare to relinquish “all rights that she might acquire as wife or
widow in taxpayer’s property, both real and personal, excepting the
right to maintenance and support.”5 The inducements for entering into
the agreement were (i) the contemplated marriage, (ii) a desire to make
fair requital for the release of marital rights, (iii) freedom for the taxpayer to make appropriate provisions for his children and other dependents, and (iv) the uncertainty surrounding the taxpayer’s financial and
marital tranquility.6
The first trust that Mr. Merrill created was an irrevocable trust. It
was formed within ninety days of the marriage, funded with $300,000,
and included provisions conforming to Miss Desmare’s wishes. The second and third trusts were to be created under Mr. Merrill’s Will, and
* Kevin E. Packman is a Partner at Holland & Knight LLP in that firm’s Miami,
Florida office. Mr. Packman is an ACTEC Fellow.
1 324 U.S. 308 (1945).
2 Id. at 312-13.
3 Id. at 313.
4 Id. at 309.
5 Id.
6 Id.
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each to be funded with $300,000 upon his death. The second trust would
also benefit Miss Desmare and contain the same provisions as within the
irrevocable trust, whereas the third trust was to benefit any children of
their marriage.
Mr. Merrill filed a 1939 gift tax return reporting the creation and
funding of the irrevocable trust, but claimed that no tax was due. The
I.R.S. disagreed and sought to collect a deficiency of $99,000 resulting
from the transfer. Mr. Merrill paid the $99,000 tax, and then filed a
claim for refund.7 When the refund was denied, he filed suit in district
court8 where he was vindicated. The I.R.S. then appealed to the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals, which reversed,9 and the Court granted
certiorari.10
The Merrill Court noted that the resolution of the case turned on
the proper interpretation of section 503 of the Revenue Act of 1932
(“1932 Act”),11 which provided,
[W]here property is transferred for less than adequate and full
consideration in money or money’s worth, then the amount by
which the value of the property exceeded the value of the consideration shall, for the purpose of the tax imposed by this title,
be deemed a gift, and shall be included in computing the
amount of gifts made during the calendar year.12
The Merrill Court then cited the Estate of Sanford13 in finding that
the
gift tax was supplementary to the estate tax. The two are in
pari materia and must be construed together. The phrase on
the meaning of which decision must largely turn – that is, transfers for other than adequate and full consideration in money or
money’s worth – came into the gift tax by way of estate tax
provisions. It first appeared in the Revenue Act of 1926.14
Although the 1932 Act did not reference the relinquishment of
marital rights in the gift tax context, it did affirmatively state the relinquishment of marital rights does not constitute consideration in money
or money’s worth for estate tax purposes.15 By virtue of its finding in
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15

Id. at 310.
Merrill v. Fahs, 51 F. Supp. 120, 123 (S.D. Fla. 1943).
Fahs v. Merrill, 142 F.2d 651, 652, 655 (5th Cir. 1944).
Merrill v. Fahs, 324 U.S. 308, 310 (1945).
Revenue Act of 1932, ch. 209, §503, 47 Stat. 169, 247 (1932).
Merrill, 324 U.S. at 310.
Estate of Sanford v. Comm’r, 308 U.S. 39, 44 (1939).
Merrill, 324 U.S. at 311.
Id. at 312.
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Estate of Sanford that the estate and gift tax must be construed together,
the Merrill Court believed that it must read the same interpretation into
the gift tax setting. It stated,
[T]o interpret the same phrases in the two taxes concerning the
same subject matter in different ways where obvious reasons
do not compel divergent treatment is to introduce another and
needless complexity into this already irksome situation. Here,
strong reasons urge identical construction. To hold otherwise
would encourage tax avoidance.16
Justice Reed dissented. While he noted that taxability of gifts to a
spouse in exchange for the release of marital rights had been in dispute
before the enactment of the 1932 Act, he seemed particularly bothered
by the Court’s reading a clause into the gift tax setting that did not exist
in the 1932 Act. He wrote that in section 804 of the 1932 Act, Congress
“declared that a transfer of marital rights should not be consideration in
money or money’s worth under the estate tax provisions.”17 However,
section 503 of the 1932 Act, which applied to gift tax, did not have a
provision forbidding the valuation of marital rights. Justice Reed
pointed out that “when Congress expressly provided that relinquishment of dower, curtesy or other statutory estate was not consideration
for estate tax purposes and left the gift tax provision without such a
limitation, it intended that these rights be accorded a different treatment
under these sections.”18
While Merrill remains good law, there have been legislative changes
that have weakened its impact. These changes include the creation of a
gift tax exemption and elimination of certain transfers from gift tax
treatment. Notwithstanding its weakening, one piece of legislation actually strengthened the Merrill decision by eviscerating the impact of Justice Reed’s dissent. In 1958, Treasury Regulation section 25.2512-8 was
introduced. The Regulation brought the legal support that the Merrill
Court imagined already existed when deciding the case. The Regulation
provides as follows:
[A] consideration not reducible to a value in money or
money’s worth, as love and affection, promise of marriage, etc.,
is to be wholly disregarded and the entire value of the property
transferred constitutes the amount of the gift. Similarly, a relinquishment or promised relinquishment of dower or curtesy,
or of a statutory estate created in lieu of dower or curtesy, or
of other marital rights in the spouse’s property or estate, shall
16
17
18

Id. at 313.
Id. at 315 (Reed, J., dissenting).
Id. (Reed, J., dissenting).
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not be considered to any extent a consideration in money or
money’s worth.19
While his dissent is no longer applicable, Justice Reed had the
stronger argument at the time Merrill was decided. With the introduction of Treasury Regulation section 25.2512-8, the Merrill Court had legal support for its conclusion. However, at the time of the decision, the
Court created new law, as opposed to interpreting existing law.
Twenty years after Merrill was decided, the I.R.S. abandoned its
view that the waiver of support rights could not serve as consideration
under section 2043(b)(1).20 In Revenue Ruling 68-379 the I.R.S. notes
that
the regulations make no reference to support rights. Consequently, since support rights are distinguishable from inheritance rights, a surrender of support rights is not a surrender of
“other marital rights,” as that phrase is used in the regulations.
A release of support rights by a wife constitutes a consideration in money or money’s worth.21
Today, Merrill, Treasury Regulation section 25.2512-8, and Revenue Ruling 68-379 provide a road map for practitioners who wish to
draft a prenuptial agreement and avoid any resulting transfers classifying as a taxable gift. There is simply no reason for a prenuptial agreement to include language that has no impact on consideration, and could
result in a gift being made by the wealthier spouse. Prohibited language
includes statements by which a spouse is waiving his or her rights “of
dower or curtesy, or of a statutory estate created in lieu of dower or
curtesy, or of other marital rights in the spouse’s property or estate.”22
A further minimization to the Merrill’s impact is the marital gift tax
deduction, which was introduced in 1948 (“1948 Act”),23 three years after Merrill was decided. When enacted, the deduction was limited to
fifty percent of the gift, and only when the gift was made to a spouse.
Thus, even if the transfer by Mr. Merrill would have qualified for the
marital deduction in the 1948 Act, the outcome would not have
changed, only the size of the gift. However, the Economic Recovery
Tax Act of 1981 (“1981 Act”)24 brought the unlimited marital deduction.
19

Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-8.
See Estate of Herrmann v. Comm’r, 85 F.3d 1032, 1037 (2d Cir. 1996) (citing Rev.
Rul. 12367, 1946-2 C.B. 166, 166-69).
21 Rev. Rul. 68-379, 1968-2 C.B. 414.
22 Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-8.
23 Revenue Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-471, 62 Stat. 110 (1948) (codified as
amended at I.R.C. § 812).
24 Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, 95 Stat. 176 (1981) (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 1).
20
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As such, there is simply no longer a reason for a taxpayer to make a
taxable gift when transferring assets to a spouse. The fact that Mr. Merrill’s transfer was in trust would not impact the applicability of the unlimited marital gift tax exemption, as the 1981 Act extends the
deduction for “qualified terminable interest property.”25
So what is the current impact of Merrill on prenuptial agreements?
According to LearnVest.com, “the most common purpose for a prenup
is to determine who gets what in the event of a divorce.”26 If one accepts that a prenuptial agreement is prepared to allocate property upon
the dissolution of the marriage, there is no reason for any resulting
transfer to generate a taxable gift. Section 2516 of the Code was enacted as part of the 1954 Code. It was designed to provide guidance on
avoiding gift tax treatment on transfers between spouses in connection
with divorce. The committee report stated, “under present law property
settlements between spouses are not regarded as taxable gifts if the
property settlement is incorporated in the decree of divorce. However,
the gift tax status under present law of settlements not incorporated in
the decree of divorce is uncertain.”27
To comply with section 2516, taxpayers must comply with the following requirements: (i) a written agreement regarding the marital and
property rights of the spouses and (ii) a final decree of divorce.28 The
final decree of divorce must be received within one year prior to or two
years after the execution of the agreement. The applicable Treasury
Regulation provides as follows:
Section 2516 provides that transfers of property or interest in
property made under the terms of a written agreement between spouses in settlement of their marital or property rights
are deemed to be for an adequate and full consideration in
money or money’s worth and, therefore, exempt from the gift
tax (whether or not such agreement is approved by a divorce
decree), if the spouses obtain a final decree of divorce from
each other within two years after entering into the
agreement.29
There clearly does not seem to be a reason to use a prenuptial
agreement, as in Merrill, to reference either party will be releasing marital rights in exchange for property. Furthermore, if the wealthier spouse
25

See I.R.C. § 2523(f)(2).
Alden Wicker, 9 Things You’re Embarrassed to Ask About Prenups, LEARNVEST
(July 2, 2013), https://www.learnvest.com/2013/07/9-things-youre-embarrassed-to-ask-ab
out-prenups (last visited Dec. 5, 2016).
27 S. REP. NO. 83-1622, at 128 (1954).
28 Treas. Reg. §25.2516-1(a).
29 Id.
26
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desires to transfer assets to the other spouse after they are married, the
transfer will qualify for the unlimited marital deduction. Finally, if the
prenuptial agreement is prepared to provide for the transfer of assets
subsequent to divorce, Merrill has no application, as section 2516 will
exclude such transfer from gift tax.

